민자사업

https://development.asia/summary/how-restore-confidence-public-private-partnerships?fbclid=IwAR1RiyumCduxn94RBQInwnmuVpH7i2VOr7VGLuezg7cSuFfS_bKPavHtUiY

How to Restore Confidence in Public–Private Partnerships

 

Published: 23 November 2020

Contractual arrangements for PPP infrastructure procurement must be improved.

Overview 
개요

Public–private partnership (PPP) transactions are declining across the world at a time when infrastructure development is acutely needed to accelerate economic recovery. As shown in Figure 1, the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database reported a reduction in developing and emerging market PPP investment commitments in 2019 relative to 2018—a trend which began in 2012. This is also reflected in the Global Infrastructure Hub’s Infrastructure Monitor 2020(link is external) report.

경제 회복을 가속화하기 위해 인프라 개발이 절실한 상황에서 PPP(민간 협력) 거래는 전 세계적으로 감소하고 있다. 아래 그림 1과 같이, PPI(Private Investment in Infrastructure) 데이터베이스는 개발 및 신흥 시장의 PPP 투자예정이 2012년부터 시작하여 2018년까지의 트렌드에 비해 2019년는 감소를 나타낸다. 이는 Global Infrastructure Hub의 Infrastructure Monitor 2020(link is external) 보고서에도 반영되어 있다.

The reasons for this decline are numerous. On the government side, there is a perception that PPPs are not delivering “value for money” as intended. On the private sector side, the risks associated with PPP transactions have become excessive and unpredictable. This is partly because parties are bound by long-term contracts and financing arrangements that are ill-suited in dealing with unforeseen situations, particularly in an era of unprecedented technological and social change. This sentiment was widespread even before the onset of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) crisis, and concerns regarding the lack of flexibility in PPP contracts have been significantly exacerbated by the pandemic.

이러한 감소의 원인은 무수하다. 정부 측에서는 PPP가 의도한 대로 '돈에 대한 가치(VFM)'를 전달하지 못하고 있다는 인식이 깔려 있다. 민간 부문에서는 PPP 거래와 관련된 리스크가 과도하고 예측하기 어렵게 되어있다. 이는 당사자들이 특히 전례 없는 기술 및 사회적 변화의 시대에서 예기치 못한 상황을 다루는데 적합하지 않은 장기 계약과 자금 조달 약정에 묶여 있기 때문이다. 이러한 분위기는 코로나바이러스병(COVID-19) 위기가 시작되기 전부터 널리 퍼져 있었으며, PPP 계약의 유연성 결여에 대한 우려가 대유행으로 인해 크게 악화되었다.

Figure 1: PPI Database Dashboard Data on PPP Projects, 1990-2019
그림1. PPI 데이터배이스 PPP 프로젝틔, 1999~2019

Source: PPI database. https://ppi.worldbank.org/en/ppi (accessed 20 September 2020).

Against this background, a recent ADB Governance Brief(link is external) has recommended reforms to current PPP contracting practices, incorporating various alternative arrangements and taking into account the associated governance challenges, in order to "restore confidence" in PPPs.

이러한 배경에서, 최근의 ADB Governance Brief(외부 링크)는 PPP에 대한 "신뢰도 회복"을 위해 다양한 대체 약정을 통합하고 관련된 거버넌스 과제를 고려하여 현재의 PPP 계약 관행에 대한 개혁을 권고했다.

Risk Allocation and Dispute Resolution
리스크할당 및 분쟁해결방안

There are many reasons for the global decline in PPP activity. One of the key problem areas is the treatment of project risks—since risk allocation is at the very heart of every PPP transaction.

PPP 활동이 전세계적으로 감소하는 데에는 많은 이유가 있다. 주요 문제 중 하나는 위험 배분이 모든 PPP 트랜잭션의 핵심이기 때문에 프로젝트 리스크를 처리하는 것입니다.

Frequently, the main points of friction in PPP projects are related to particular aspects of risk allocation. This friction has significantly contributed to the overall loss of confidence, in both the public and private sectors, in PPP transactions.

PPP 프로젝트의 주요 마찰은 위험 배분의 특정 측면과 관련이 있다. 이러한 마찰은 공공 부문과 민간 부문 모두에서 PPP 거래에 대한 전반적인 신뢰 상실에 크게 기여했다.

Approach to PPP dispute resolution is another key area where reforms should be considered, given the high frequency of time-consuming and relationship-destroying PPP disputes.

시간이 많이 걸리고 관계를 파기하는 PPP 분쟁의 빈도가 높다는 점에서 비추어볼 떄, PPP 분쟁 해결을 위한 접근방법에 대한 개혁을 고려해야 할 부분이다.

Typically, PPP contracts call for a tiered, or staircase, approach to resolving disputes between the public and private parties, with each step in the process being increasingly formal (see Figure 2). However, if the parties to a PPP do not swiftly address the disagreements that inevitably arise in complex contracts, their positions can quickly harden, driving them to the expensive, time-consuming and highly adversarial processes of arbitration and/or litigation.

전형적으로 PPP 계약은 공공 당사자와 민간 당사자 간의 분쟁을 해결하기 위한 계층적 또는 계단의 접근법을 요구하며, 프로세스의 각 단계가 점점 더 공식화된다(그림 2 참조). 그러나, PPP의 당사자가 복잡한 계약에서 불가피하게 발생하는 불일치를 신속하게 해결하지 못하면, 그들의 입장은 빠르게 결정되어, 비용이 많이 들고 시간이 많이 소요되며 매우 적대적인 중재 및/또는 소송 프로세스로 이끌 수 있다.

Figure 2: Typical Dispute Resolution “Staircase” 
그림2. 일반적인 분쟁해결 "계단식"

Source: Author.

Toward More Collaborative PPPs

In addressing these issues, the governance brief examined several alternative approaches to risk allocation and dispute resolution, which have been used for various types of infrastructure transactions in different regions of the world. These include Project Partnering, a mechanism used in the construction industry, whereby the parties sign a non-binding charter, which encourages them to cooperate in the achievement of the construction objective; and the more radical alternative of Alliance Contracting, under which the parties to the contract make a formal, binding commitment to share risks and rewards, under a “no blame” regime.

Other collaborative models were also reviewed, including a regulatory asset-based approach which relies on a regulator to monitor the private sector; and the use, in countries with a civil law tradition, of “economic stability clauses,” which can provide relief in the event of economic hardship. Arrangements whereby governments take equity participation in project companies, as is frequently the case in the Peoples Republic of China were also considered. So-called “early contractor involvement” models were also reviewed, including the European “competitive dialogue” process.

Hybrid PPP models which have been used in Asia—including arrangements whereby the government develops and finances projects through to the end of the construction phase, followed by the competitive tendering of an operations/maintenance concession—were also examined. This is the essence of the "Build, Build, Build" program initiated by the Philippines and India’s "Toll Operate Transfer" program, under which its National Highways Authority can "monetize" publicly funded existing toll roads, by offering 30-year tolling concessions to private sector operators.

The other alternative contracting arrangement examined is the experience of the construction industry with standing dispute boards, which prove to be an effective mechanism for efficient resolution and for preventing disputes from materializing.

Some of the alternative approaches may not be appropriate for PPPs in the Asian region. However, the final section of the brief does offer five specific recommendations, designed to address the current "loss of confidence" in PPPs, taking into account the experience gained with different contracting models.

Recommendations

• First, governments should consider targeted incremental changes to risk allocation arrangements in the direction of a more collaborative sharing of particular risks, especially those risks associated with unanticipated events.
• Second, governments should draft contracts that consistently provide for the use of dispute boards in PPP transactions to help promote a less-adversarial approach to dispute resolution.
• Third, PPP contracts between parties should include provisions that encourage and facilitate the proactive management of the relationship between the parties. These provisions would serve to reinforce the point that the parties are, indeed, entering into a long-term partnership.
• Lastly, more collaborative approaches to PPPs will necessarily require high levels of governance capacity in the public sector. This includes government officials within line ministries and central PPP units, plus finance ministry officials who deal with the fiscal arrangements for handling the contingencies associated with the projects. This point is closely related to the call for increased interdepartmental collaboration that has been made in the recently-released report(link is external) of the ADB Independent Evaluation Department.

The PPP model of infrastructure procurement should not be discarded, but traditional PPP contractual arrangements must be improved. By these various means, it should be possible to "restore confidence" in PPPs and use them effectively to help close the global infrastructure gap.

This article is adapted from the ADB Governance Brief(link is external) financed under the technical assistance for Strengthening Fiscal Governance and Sustainability in Public-Private Partnerships(link is external). The governance brief was prepared in coordination with Bruno Carrasco, chief of Governance Thematic Group, and Hanif Rahemtulla, principal public management specialist. Colin Gin, assistant general counsel, Vivek Rao, principal financial sector specialist, Joao Pedro Farinha Fernandes, principal financial sector economist, Sanjay Divakar Joshi, principal urban specialist, and Sanjay Grover, public financial management specialist, served as ADB peer reviewers alongside David Bloomgarden, ADB consultant specializing in PPP, as advisor and external peer reviewer.

Resources

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2020. Restoring Confidence in Public-Private Partnerships(link is external). The Governance Brief. Issue 41.

ADB. 2020. ADB Support for Public-Private Partnerships, 2009–2019.(link is external) Manila.

ADB. 2020. ADB Must Increase Upstream Engagements in PPPs to Address Post-COVID Investment Gap — Independent Evaluation Report.(link is external)

Global Infrastructure Hub. Infrastructure Monitor 2020.(link is external)

World Bank. Private Participation in Infrastructure Database(link is external)

Ask the Experts

• 
• Mark is the principal of Moseley Infrastructure Advisory Services. He is the former COO of the G20 Global Infrastructure Hub and a former Lead Lawyer in the World Bank’s Infrastructure Practice Group.
• Mark Moseley
  Principal, Moseley Infrastructure Advisory Services